Aligning Faithful Interpretations with their Social Attribution by Jacovi, Alon & Goldberg, Yoav
Aligning Faithful Interpretations with their Social Attribution
Alon Jacovi
Bar Ilan University
alonjacovi@gmail.com
Yoav Goldberg
Bar Ilan University and Allen Institute for AI
yoav.goldberg@gmail.com
Abstract
We find that the requirement of model in-
terpretations to be faithful is vague and in-
complete. Indeed, recent work refers to
interpretations as unfaithful despite adher-
ing to the available definition. Similarly,
we identify several critical failures with the
notion of textual highlights as faithful in-
terpretations, although they adhere to the
faithfulness definition. With textual high-
lights as a case-study, and borrowing con-
cepts from social science, we identify that
the problem is a misalignment between the
causal chain of decisions (causal attribution)
and social attribution of human behavior to
the interpretation. We re-formulate faithful-
ness as an accurate attribution of causality
to the model, and introduce the concept of
aligned faithfulness: faithful causal chains
that are aligned with their expected social
behavior. The two steps of causal attri-
bution and social attribution together com-
plete the process of explaining behavior,
making the alignment of faithful interpre-
tations a requirement. With this formal-
ization, we characterize the observed fail-
ures of misaligned faithful highlight inter-
pretations, and propose an alternative causal
chain to remedy the issues. Finally, we the
implement highlight explanations of pro-
posed causal format using contrastive expla-
nations.
1 Introduction
In formalizing the desired properties of a qual-
ity interpretation, the NLP community has settled
on the key property of faithfulness (Lipton, 2018;
Herman, 2017; Wiegreffe and Pinter, 2019), or
how “accurately” the interpretation represents the
true reasoning process of the model.
Curiously, recent work in this area describes
faithful interpretations of models as unfaithful
when they fail to describe behavior that is “ex-
pected” of them (Subramanian et al., 2020), de-
spite the interpretations seemingly complying with
faithfulness definitions. We are interested in prop-
erly characterizing faithfulness, and exploring be-
yond faithfulness what is necessary of a quality
explanation of a model decision to satisfy, in order
to cope with this contradiction.
Several methods have been proposed to train
and utilize models that faithfully “explain” their
decisions with highlights—the guiding use-case in
this work—otherwise known as an extractive ra-
tionale1, which aim to clarify what part of the in-
put was important to the decision. The proposed
models are modular in nature, composed of two
stages of (1) selecting the highlighted text, and (2)
predicting based on the highlighted text (select-
predict, described in Section 2).
We take an extensive and critical look at the
formalization of faithfulness and of explanations,
with textual highlights as an example use-case. In
particular, the select-predict models with faithful
highlights provide us with more questions than
they do answers, as we describe a variety of cu-
rious failure cases of such models in Section 4,
as well as experimentally validate that the failure
cases are indeed possible and do occur in practice.
Concretely, the behavior of the selector and pre-
dictor in these models do not necessarily line up
with expectations of people viewing the highlight.
Current literature in ML and NLP interpretability
1In the scope of this work, we use the term “highlights”
for this type of explanation. Although the term “rationale”
(Lei et al., 2016) is more commonly used for this format
in the NLP community, it is controversial, as it has been
used ambiguously for different things in NLP literature his-
torically (e.g., Zaidan et al. (2007); Bao et al. (2018); DeY-
oung et al. (2019)), it is a non-descriptive term and unintuitive
without prior knowledge, and is seldom known or used out-
side of NLP disciplines. Most importantly, “rationalization”
attributes human-like social behavior which is not necessar-
ily compatible with the artificial explainer’s incentive, unless
modeled explicitly. We elaborate on this justification further
in Section 8.
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fails to provide a theoretical foundation to charac-
terize these issues (Sections 4, 5).
In order to solve this problem, we turn to litera-
ture on the science of social explanations and how
they are utilized and perceived by humans (Sec-
tion 6): the social and cognitive sciences find that
human explanations are composed of two, equally
important parts: the attribution of a causal chain to
the decision process (causal attribution), and the
attribution of social or human-like behavior to the
causal chain (social attribution) (Miller, 2017).
We reformalize faithfulness as the (accurate) at-
tribution of a causal chain of reasoning steps to
the model decision process, which we find is the
true nature behind the vague definition provided
for this term until now. Fatally, the second key
component of human explanations—the social at-
tribution of behavior—has been missing from cur-
rent formalization on the desiderata of artificial in-
telligence explanations in NLP. In Section 7 we
define that a faithful interpretation—a causal chain
of decisions—is aligned with human expectations
if it is adequately constrained by the social behav-
ior attributed to it by human observers.
Armed with this knowledge, we are able to char-
acterize the mysterious failures of select-predict
models described in Section 4: In Section 8 we
delve into the social attribution of highlights as ex-
planation, outlining two possible attributions. We
find that select-predict does not guarantee either.
In Section 8.2 we propose an alternative causal
chain of the form of predict-select-verify. We note
that the social attribution of this causal chain is
of highlights to serve as evidence towards the pre-
dictor’s decision, and we formalize the constraints
necessary to enforce this effect.
Finally, in Section 9 we discuss an implemen-
tation of predict-select-verify, i.e., designing the
components in the roles predictor and selector.
Designing the selector is non-trivial, as there are
many possible options to select highlights that ev-
idence the predictor’s decision, and we are only
interested in selecting ones that are meaningful
for the user to understand the decision. We lever-
age advancements from cognitive research on the
internal structure of (human-given) explanations,
dictating that explanations must be contrastive to
hold tangible meaning to humans. We propose
a classification select-predict-verify model which
provides contrastive highlights—to our knowl-
edge, a first in NLP—and qualitatively exemplify
and showcase the solution.
Contributions. We redefine “faithfulness” as
the interpretation’s ability to represent the causal
chain of model decisions, and formalize “aligned
faithfulness” as the degree to which the causal
chain is aligned with the social attribution of be-
havior that humans perceive from it. The new for-
malization allows us to identify issues with cur-
rent models that derive faithful highlight interpre-
tations, and design a new model pipeline that cir-
cumvents those issues. Finally, we propose an im-
plementation of the new system with contrastive
explanations, which are more intuitive and useful.
When designing interpretable models, we
must formalize the social attribution of the
interpretation—the set of constraints on model be-
havior to resemble human reasoning—in order to
guarantee that the interpretation is aligned with ex-
pectations of human intent, in addition to being
faithful.
2 Highlights as Faithful Interpretations
Highlights, also known as extractive rationales,
are binary masks over a given input which imply
some kind of behavioral interpretation of a partic-
ular model’s decision process to arrive at a deci-
sion on the input.
Formally, given input x ∈ Rn and model
m : Rn −→ Y , a highlight interpretation h ∈ Zn2
is a binary mask over x which attaches a meaning
to m(x), where the portion of x highlighted by h
was important to the decision.
This functionality of h was interpreted by Lei
et al. (2016) as an implication of a behavioral pro-
cess ofm(x), where the decision process is a mod-
ular composition of two unfolding stages:
1. Selector component ms : Rn −→ Zn2 selects
a binary highlight h over x.
2. Predictor componentmp : Rn −→ Y makes
a prediction on the input h x.
The final prediction of the system at inference
is m(x) = mp(ms(x)  x). We refer to h as the
highlight and h x as the highlighted text.
A highlight interpretation can be faithful or un-
faithful to a model. Literature accepts a highlight
interpretation as faithful if the highlight was the
output of the selector component, and the input to
the predictor component, which outputs the final
prediction. These claims are, of course, verifiable
only in select-predict models (notwithstanding ad-
vances in the understanding of other opaque mod-
els), and thus faithful highlight interpretations are
limited to models of this structure.
Implementations. Various methods have been
proposed to build modular systems with the ability
to derive faithful highlights in this way. Lei et al.
(2016) have proposed to train the selector and pre-
dictor end-to-end via the REINFORCE (Williams,
1992) algorithm. Bastings et al. (2019) have pro-
posed to formalize the highlight as a latent variable
sequence, replacing REINFORCE with the repa-
rameterization trick (Kingma and Welling, 2014).
Citing significant difficulty in training these so-
lutions, Jain et al. (2020) have proposed to train
the selector and predictor separately, by first train-
ing a separate model on the end task, and using
an unfaithful highlight interpretation method on
this model to select a highlight, then training the
predictor on highlighted examples. We refer to
this system by its given name as FRESH. Outside
of NLP, Chen et al. (2018) describe select-predict
models for feature-vector inputs trained to maxi-
mize mutual information between the selected fea-
tures and the response variable.
3 Utility of Highlights
We have described multiple possible ap-
proaches to faithful highlight interpretations. Is it
enough, however, for highlights to be faithful—
adhering to the select-predict composition—in or-
der to be useful as indicators of the model’s deci-
sion process?
To answer these questions, we must first discuss
potential uses of the technology. Throughout this
work, we will refer to the following use-cases:
1. Dispute: A user may want to dispute a
model’s decision, e.g. in a legal setting. A
user can dispute either the selector or the pre-
dictor: a user may refer to words that were
not selected in the highlight, and say: “the
model ignored information A, but it shouldn’t
have.” The user can also refer to the words
that were fed to the predictor, and say: “based
on this highlighted text, I would have ex-
pected a different outcome.”
2. Debug: Highlights allow a designation of
model errors into two categories: did the
model focus on the wrong part of the input,
or did the model make the wrong prediction
based on the correct part of the input? Based
on the category, specific action may be taken
to alleviate the specific error: influence the
model to focus on the correct part of the in-
put, or influence the model to make better
judgements when the focus is correct.
3. Advice: When the user does not know the
correct decision and is advised by a model,
the user can be advised in two ways: (1)
assuming that the user trusts the model, the
highlight provides feedback on which part is
important to make a decision; (2) if the user
does not entirely trust the model, we assume
that the user has a prior notion on attributes of
the highlight selection process. If the model
highlight is aligned or not aligned with this
prior, then the user can opt to trust or not
trust the model’s decision. For example, if
the highlight is focused on punctuation and
stop words, as the user believes that the high-
light should include content words.
4 Limitations of Highlights as (Faithful)
Interpretations
We detail a variety of strange and surprising fail-
ures where select-predict models are uninforma-
tive to the above use-cases, as evidence of an ap-
parent weakness in the formalization of faithful-
ness as a property of explanations. The failures
are a possible risk in all current solutions of high-
light interpretations.
4.1 Trojan Explanations
Task information can manifest in the highlighted
text in exceedingly unintuitive ways, where the
highlight is faithful, but functionally useless to the
intended use-cases. For example, consider the fol-
lowing case of a faithfully highlighted decision
process:
1. The selector makes a prediction y, then se-
lects an arbitrary highlight h that encodes y.
2. The predictor then extracts h from h x and
decodes y from h.
It is easy to see why the highlight becomes use-
less: the meaning that the highlight holds to the
user is completely misaligned with the true role
of the highlight in the decision process. E.g., in
Model SST-2 AGNews IMDB Ev.Inf. 20News Elec
Random baseline 50.0 25.0 50.0 33.33 5.0 50.0
Lei et al. (2016) 59.7 41.4 69.11 33.45 60.75
Bastings et al. (2019) 62.8 42.4 9.45
FRESH 52.22 35.35 54.23 38.88 11.11 58.38
Table 1: The performance of an RNN classifier using h
alone as input, in comparison to the random baseline.
Missing cells denote cases where we were unable to
converge training.
Model AGNews IMDB 20News Elec
Full text baseline 41.39 51.22 8.91 56.41
Lei et al. (2016) 46.83 57.83 60.4
Bastings et al. (2019) 47.69 9.66
FRESH 43.29 52.46 12.53 57.7
Table 2: The performance of a classifier using quanti-
ties of the following tokens in h  x: comma, period,
dash, escape, ampersand, brackets, and star; as well as
the quantity of capital letters and |hx|. Missing cells
are cases where we were unable to converge training.
the advice use-case, the seemingly random high-
lighted text will cause the user to distrust the pre-
diction of the model, despite the model quite re-
alistically making informed and correct decisions
based on well-generalizing reasoning.
Though this case may appear incredibly unnat-
ural, it is nevertheless not explicitly avoided by
faithful highlights of select-predict models or by
the solutions available today. In other words, a
highlight can still be regarded as perfectly faithful
to a model that works in this way. As a result, there
is no guarantee against highlights that encode task-
relevant signal by themselves, without usage of the
text itself. After all, we never demanded as such.
It should not be particularly surprising, then,
that this is actually the case: the above “uninten-
tional” exploit of the modular process is a per-
fectly valid trajectory in the training process of
the highlight interpretation methods available to-
day. We are able to verify this by attempting to
predict the model’s output based on h alone via
another model (Table 1): although this experiment
does not “prove” that the predictor utilizes this in-
formation, it shows that there is no guarantee that
it doesn’t.
Definition. The above is an example of a phe-
nomenon we term the Trojan explanation: the ex-
planation (in our case, h  x) carries information
which is encoded in ways that are unintuitive, dif-
ficult to discover or otherwise unintended by the
user which observes the interpretation as an expla-
nation of model behavior. In the above case, this
information is the prediction label, and the “un-
intuitive” encoding was manifested using h alone,
but of course the issue is not limited to those meth-
ods. The information encoded in hx can be any-
thing which will be useful to predict y and which
the user will find hard to comprehend.
Below are cases of Trojans which are reason-
ably general to multiple tasks and use-cases:
1. Highlight signal: The label is encoded in the
mask h alone, requiring no information from
the original text it is purported to focus on.
2. Arbitrary token mapping: The label is en-
coded via some mapping from highlighted to-
kens to labels which is considered arbitrary
to the user, such as commas for a particular
class, and periods for another.
3. Arbitrary statistics mapping: The label is
encoded in arbitrary statistics of the high-
lighted text, such as quantity of capital letters,
distance between commas, and so on.
4. The default class: In a classification case, a
class can be predicted by precluding the abil-
ity to predict all other classes and selecting it
by default. As a result, the selector may de-
cide that the absence of class features in itself
defines one of the classes.
In Table 2 we report on an attempt to predict the
decision (by training an MLP classifier) of select-
predict models from quantities of seemingly irrel-
evant characters, such as commas and dashes, of
the highlighted texts generated by the models. The
results are compared against a baseline of attempt-
ing to predict the decisions based on the same
statistics on the full text. Surprisingly, all mod-
els show an increased ability to predict their de-
cisions on some level compared to the full text,
showing that the highlights selected by these mod-
els carry additional information—which was not
in the original input—that can be leveraged by the
predictor to make decisions.
We stress that these Trojan explanations are
not merely possible, but just as reasonable to the
model as any other option, and difficult to counter
explicitly, as we have not yet truly formalized the
extent of what is regarded as a Trojan—or why it
is undesirable at all2—and possibilities of Trojans
2It can be argued that for some tasks, it is reasonable for
Model Text and Highlight Prediction
(a) i really don’t have much to say about this book holder, not that it’s just a book holder. it’s a nice one. it does it’s job . it’s a little
too expensive for just a piece of plastic. it’s strong, sturdy, and it’s big enough, even for those massive heavy textbooks, like the
calculus ones. although, i would not recommend putting a dictionary or reference that’s like 6” thick (even though it still may
hold). it’s got little clamps at the bottom to prevent the page from flipping all over the place, although those tend to fall off when
you move them. but that’s no big deal. just put them back on. this book holder is kind of big, and i would not put it on a small desk
in the middle of a classroom, but it’s not too big. you should be able to put it almost anywhere when studying on your own time.
Positive
(b) i really don’t have much to say about this book holder, not that it’s just a book holder. it’s a nice one. it does it’s job . it’s a little
too expensive for just a piece of plastic. it’s strong, sturdy, and it’s big enough, even for those massive heavy textbooks, like the
calculus ones. although, i would not recommend putting a dictionary or reference that’s like 6” thick (even though it still may
hold). it’s got little clamps at the bottom to prevent the page from flipping all over the place, although those tend to fall off when
you move them. but that’s no big deal. just put them back on. this book holder is kind of big, and i would not put it on a small desk
in the middle of a classroom, but it’s not too big. you should be able to put it almost anywhere when studying on your own time.
Positive
Table 3: Highlights faithfully attributed to two fictional select-predict models on an elaborate Amazon Reviews
sentiment classification example. Although highlight (a) is easier to understand, it is also far less useful, as the
selector clearly made hidden decisions.
are conceptually limitless. Indeed, Trojan expla-
nations have been observed in practice.3
A note about FRESH. The FRESH (Jain et al.,
2020) solution to faithful highlights, via training
the selector and predictor separately, may seem to
be a natural solution to Trojan explanations, since
the two models are unable to communicate during
training. We note that even in the FRESH com-
position, the selector was trained on the end task
to make decisions before deriving a highlight. As
such, it is quite possible for the selector to disguise
a Trojan “enemy” in the highlighted text.
4.2 The Dominant Selector
The Trojan explanation example serves to illus-
trate that the select-predict process is not always
representative of the expectation that a human will
have when given a highlight interpretation of this
process. Unfortunately, our troubles are not lim-
ited to Trojan explanations, for it is possible to
represent unintuitive decision processes through
faithful highlights in other ways.
To illustrate this point, consider the case of the
binary sentiment analysis task, where the model
predicts the polarity of a particular snippet of text.
Assume that two fictional selector-predictor mod-
els attempt to classify a complex, mixed-polarity
review of a product. Table 3 describes two pos-
sible highlights faithfully attributed to these two
h to encode label information, e.g., when particular labels are
more often attributed by words in the beginning of the text,
compared to others. Similar conclusions apply to other types
of Trojans. How could we clarify when a property is or is not
a Trojan for a given task?
3By us and others. Although presented in very different
context, Subramanian et al. (2020) do in fact show cases of
Trojan explanations in practice for a different class of com-
positional models.
models, on an example selected from the Amazon
Reviews sentiment classification dataset.
Although the models made the same decision,
the implied reasoning process is wildly different
thanks to the different highlights chosen by the se-
lector. In model (a), the selector clearly performed
the entirety of the decision process. Had selector
(a) chosen a negative-sentiment word such as “ex-
pensive”, the predictor would reasonably predict
a negative sentiment for this example. In other
words, for model (a), the selector dictates the en-
tire decision process, even if the highlight is not a
“Trojan” by any means.
Comparatively, the selector of model (b) per-
formed a far simpler job, highlighting a selective
summary of the review, with both positive and
negative sentiments. The predictor then made a
decision based on the information. How the pre-
dictor made the decision based on this highlighted
text is unclear, but the division of roles between
the selector and predictor is more intuitive to the
observer than in the case of model (a).
Let us focus on the dispute use-case. Given a
claim such as “the sturdiness of the product was
not important to the final decision”, the claim ap-
pears safer in the case of model (b) than it is in the
case of model (a), since in model (a), it is diffi-
cult to say how the selector arrived at the selected
highlight—and thus, difficult to dispute a decision
following the claim. There is an implicit under-
standing of the highlight of model (b) as a descrip-
tor of a decision process that supports this claim.
To clarify, in this failure case, the selector is not
limited to reducing the input to a trivially solved
snippet (such as selecting single words strongly
associated with a class, per the example), but that
the selector is capable of dictating the final de-
SST-2 SST-3 SST-5 LGD AG News IMDB Ev. Inf. MultiRC Movies Beer
Lei et al. (2016) 22.65 7.09 9.85 33.33 22.23 36.59 31.43 160.0 37.93
Bastings et al. (2019) 3.31 0 2.97 201.02 199.02 12.63 85.19 75.0 13.64
FRESH 90.0 17.82 13.45 418.69 50.0 14.66 9.76 0.0 20.0
Table 4: The percentage increase in error of selector-predictor highlight methods compared to an equivalent archi-
tecture model which was trained to classify complete text. E.g., 10% means that the error is x1.1, or 110%, that
of the full-text equivalent of the same architecture. We prioritize the numbers reported in previous work whenever
possible, and preferably the original papers of each methodology (italics means our results). Architectures are not
necessarily consistent across different cells in the table, and thus they do not imply performance superiority of
absolute metrics with the “best” architectures. The highlight lengths chosen for each experiment were chosen with
precedence whenever possible, and otherwise chosen as 20% following Jain et al. (2020) precedence.
cision with power not intended to it: even an
entirely random predictor can be manipulated to
perform well by a crafty selector. But why is this
considered problematic, if it remains within the
confines of faithful highlights?
4.3 Loss of Performance
The selector-predictor format implies a loss of per-
formance in comparison to models that classify the
full available text in “one” opaque step—refer to
Table 4 for examples on the degree of decrease in
performance on various classification datasets. In
many cases, this decrease is severe. Although this
phenomenon is treated as a reasonable and matter-
of-fact necessity by literature on highlight inter-
pretations and rationales, the intuition behind it is
not trivial to us.
Naturally, humans are able to provide highlights
of decisions without any loss of accuracy, even
when the selector and predictor are separate peo-
ple (Jain et al., 2020). In addition, while inter-
pretability may be prioritized over state-of-the-art
performance in certain use-cases, there are also
cases that will disallow the implementation of ar-
tificial models unless they are strong and inter-
pretable, simultaneously.4
Often, sufficiency is deemed to be a desiderata
of highlights: the highlighted text should be suf-
ficient to make an informed judgement (Yu et al.,
2019; DeYoung et al., 2019) towards the correct
label. Under the selector-predictor setup, the high-
lighted text is at least guaranteed to be sufficient to
predict the same result as the model.
In this context, the following question is critical
to the design of highlight models: why do mod-
els that provide highlight interpretations surrender
4For example, consider the case of a doctor or patient
seeking life-saving advice—it is difficult to quantify a trade-
off between performance and explanation ability.
performance to do so? Is this phenomenon neces-
sary, or desirable? And why?
This question can be re-interpreted in the fol-
lowing way: in the causal chain of events behind
the decision process for a given task, which comes
first: the prediction, or the highlight selection? Is
the answer constant, or contextual?
Consider the case of agreement classification,
where the task is to classify whether a given snip-
pet contains grammatically disagreeing words. In
this case, most would agree that it is impossible
to provide a sufficient highlight without making a
decision first. However, for example, when decid-
ing the polarity of a review snippet in a sentiment
classification task, it may be natural to first make
a selection of relevant phrases before finally mak-
ing a decision based on them. Can we say that it
is appropriate to surrender performance in order to
provide highlight interpretations in either case, in
both, or in neither?
4.4 Conclusion
The described failure cases shed light on a miss-
ing step in the derivation of interpretations that
are useful, despite adhering faithfully to a select-
predict model. We conclude that faithfulness is
insufficient to formalize the desired properties
of a behavioral explanation behind the decision
of an artificial intelligence model.
5 Plausibility is Not the Answer
Following the failure cases described in Section 4,
it may be theorized that plausibility is a desirable,
or even necessary, condition for useful highlights
and interpretations in general. After all, Trojan ex-
planations are by default implausible. However,
we argue that this is far from the case.
Plausibility (Wiegreffe and Pinter, 2019) or per-
suasiveness (Herman, 2017) is the property of how
convincing the interpretation is towards the model
prediction, regardless of whether the model was
correct or not, and regardless of whether the inter-
pretation is faithful or not. It is a property inspired
by human-given explanations, which are post-hoc
stories generated to plausibly justify our actions
(Rudin, 2019). Plausibility is generally quantified
by the degree that the model’s highlights resemble
gold-annotated highlights given by humans (Bast-
ings et al., 2019) or by querying for the feedback
of humans directly (Jain et al., 2020).
Supposing that faithfulness has been “achieved”
(unclear as that condition may be), plausibility
is still without utility unless this plausibility is
correlated with the likelihood of the model to
be correct (Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). Al-
though it is possible to quantify this correlation via
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) assignments
(e.g., Feng and Boyd-Graber (2019)), it remains ir-
relevant to other use-cases of interpretability, since
model correctness is intractable.
The failures discussed above stem not from how
convincing the interpretation is, but from how well
the user understands the reasoning process of the
model. If the user is able to comprehend the steps
that the model has taken to its decision, then the
user will be the one to decide whether these steps
are plausible or not, based on how closely these
steps fit the user’s prior knowledge on whatever
correct steps should be taken—whether the user
knows the correct answer or not, and whether the
model is correct or not.
For example, in Figure 3, we are not interested
in whether the highlighted text is plausible as an
explanation to the decision—in which case, model
(a) will likely be deemed superior—but rather,
which highlight implies a more coherent decision
process that the user can comprehend. It is the lat-
ter property, rather than the former, that will allow
the model to be useful in any of the use-cases of
highlight interpretations, such as dispute or debug.
This means that the important attribute of model
(b)’s highlight is not that it may be a closer match
to a gold-annotated human highlight; but that the
roles of the selector and predictor resemble those
of a human decision maker. The difference is that
even if the model made a “wrong” decision, the
latter attribute will stay valid, unlike the former.
6 On Faithfulness, Plausibility, and
Explainability from the Science of
Human Explanations
Clearly, the mathematical foundation of machine
learning and natural language processing is insuf-
ficient to tackle the underlying issue behind the
painful symptoms described in Section 4. In fact,
formalizing the problem itself is difficult. What
enables a faithful explanation to be understood as
accurate to the model? And what causes an expla-
nation to be perceived as a Trojan?
Although work by the community in this direc-
tion is well placed, it often neglects to draw upon
the extremely vast library of work on the science
of human explanation. As a result, some of the
work re-invents the wheel, and we have yet arrived
at a satisfactory formalization. We will attempt to
better understand the problem by looking to the
social sciences, and particularly philosophical re-
search on human explanations of (human) behav-
ior, to assist us.5
6.1 The Composition of Explanations
Miller (2017) describes explanations of behavior
as a social interaction of knowledge transfer be-
tween the explainer and the explainee, and thus
they are contextual, and can be perceived differ-
ently depending on this context. Two central pil-
lars of the explanation are causal attribution—
the attribution of a causal chain6 of events to the
behavior—and social attribution—the attribution
of behavior to others (Heider et al., 1958).
Causal attribution describes faithfulness. We
note a stark parallel between causal attribution
and faithfulness, as it is understood by the NLP
community: for example, the select-predict com-
position of modules defines an unfolding causal
chain where the selector hides portions of the in-
put, causing the predictor to make a decision based
on the remaining portions.
Social attribution is missing. Heider and Sim-
mel (1944) describe an experiment where partici-
pants attribute human concepts of emotion, inten-
tionality and behavior to animated shapes. Clearly,
the same phenomenon persists when humans at-
5Refer to Miller (2017) for a substantial survey in this
area, which was especially motivating to us.
6See Hilton et al. (2005) for a breakdown of types of
causal chains; we focus on unfolding chains in this work, but
others may be relevant as well.
tempt to understand the predictions of artificial
models. What is the behavior attributed to the
select-predict causal chain? And can models be
constrained to adhere to this attribution?
Although informally, prior work on highlights
has considered such factors before. Lei et al.
(2016) describe desiderata for highlights as being
“short and consecutive”, and Jain et al. (2020) in-
terpreted “short” as “around the same length as
that of human-annotated highlights”. We assert
that the true nature of these claims is an attempt to
constrain highlights to the social behavior implic-
itly attributed to them by human observers in the
select-predict paradigm. We discuss this further in
the next section.
Plausibility as an incentive of the explainer,
and not as a property of the explanation. The
utility of human explanations can be categorized
across multiple axes (Miller, 2017), among them
are (1) learning a better internal model for fu-
ture decisions and calculations (Lombrozo, 2006;
Williams et al., 2013); (2) examination to ver-
ify the explainer has a correct internal prediction
model; (3) teaching7 to modify the internal model
of the explainer towards a more correct one (can
be seen as the opposite end of (1)); (4) assignment
of blame to a component of the internal model; and
finally, (5) justification and persuasion.
Critically, the goal of justification and persua-
sion by the explainer may not necessarily be the
goal of the explainee. Indeed, in the case of AI ex-
plainability, it is not a goal of the explainee to be
persuaded that the decision is correct (even when
it is), but to understand the decision process. If
plausibility is a goal of the artificial model, this
perspective outlines a game theoretic mismatch of
incentives between the two players. And specif-
ically in cases where the model is incorrect, it is
interpreted as the difference between an innocent
mistake and an intentional lie—of course, lying is
considered more unethical. As a result, modeling
and pursuing plausibility in AI explanations is
an ethical issue.
7 Aligned Faithfulness
We have covered the separation of causal attribu-
tion to the model from attribution of social behav-
ior to it. In human explanations, this separation
7Although (1) and (3) are considered one-and-the-same
in the social sciences, we disentangle them as that is only the
case when the explainer and explainee are both human.
is formulated as a multi-step process in the trans-
fer of knowledge from one person to the other.
Unique to artificial explainers is a problem where
there is a misalignment between the causal chain
behind the decision, and the social attribution to it,
as the (artificial) decision process does not neces-
sarily resemble human behavior.
We claim that this problem is the root cause be-
hind the symptoms described in Section 4. In this
section we define the general desiderata of inter-
pretations to satisfy to avoid this issue, separated
from the narrative of highlight interpretations.
7.1 Definition
By presenting to the user the causal pipeline of de-
cisions in the model decision process as an inter-
pretation of the decision process, the user naturally
conjures social intent behind this pipeline. This in-
tent is formalized as a set of constraints on the pos-
sible range of decisions at each step in the causal
chain, which the model must adhere to in order to
be considered as comprehensible to the user.
For an interpretation method to accurately de-
scribe the causal chain of decisions in a model de-
cision, we say that it is faithful; and having accom-
plished that, for the method and model to adhere
to the social attribution of behavior by humans,
we say that the interpretation is aligned, short for
human-aligned, or “aligned with human expecta-
tions”. Furthermore, we claim that this attribution
of behavior is heavily contextual on the task and
use-case of the model, and that it is incompatible
with plausibility.
8 Social Attribution of Highlight
Interpretations
As previously mentioned, unique to our setting in
NLP and ML is the fact that the social attribution
must lead the design of the causal chain, since
we have control over one and not the other. In
other words, we must first identify the behavior
expected of the decision process, and constrain the
decision process around it.
We arrive at two parallel attributions of human
behavior to highlights, where each carries separate
and distinct constraints on whether the highlight
can describe behavior aligned with human intent.
Highlights as summaries. The highlight serves
as an extractive summary of the input text, filtering
irrelevant information, making it easier to focus on
the portions of the input most important.8 To il-
lustrate, recall a student who is marking sentences
and paragraphs in a book to make studying for a
test easier. The highlight is merely considered a
compressed version of the input, with sufficient
information to make informed decisions in the fu-
ture. It is not selected with an answer in mind, but
in anticipation that an answer will be derived in
the future, for a question that may not have even
been asked yet.
Highlights as evidence. Another name for high-
light explanations in the NLP community is ex-
tractive rationales, or rationalization, due to this
human characterization of the artificial explainer:
the highlight serves as evidence towards a prior
decision. The decision process behind the prior
decision must consider the highlight as supporting
evidence of the decision, whether the highlight is
sufficient, comprehensive, or neither.
8.1 Issues with Select-Predict
Unfortunately, the select-predict causal chain sup-
ports neither attribution:
1. A summarizing selector is expected to fil-
ter out info which is irrelevant to making
an informed decision, without making any
decision in doing so. It is not guaranteed
by black-box selectors which were explicitly
trained on the end-task.
2. An evidencing or rationalizing selector
should select the part of the input that sup-
ports the final decision without influencing
this decision. This is clearly not the case in
select-predict models.
The issues discussed in Section 4 are direct re-
sults of the above conflation of interests. Trojan
highlights and the dominant selector are a result
of a selector that makes hidden and unintended de-
cisions, so they serve as neither summary nor ev-
idence towards the predictor’s decision. Loss of
performance is due to the selector acting as an im-
perfect summarizer.
8.2 Predict-Select-Verify
We focus on highlights as evidence: we propose
the predict-select-verify causal chain as a solution
that can be constrained to provide highlights as ev-
idence. The decision pipeline is as followings:
8The definition of a summary and the utility of summa-
rization in tasks (Yu, 2013) is beyond the scope of this work.
1. The predictor mp makes a prediction yˆ :=
mp(x) on the full text.
2. The selectorms selects h := ms(x) such that
mp(h x) = yˆ.
In this framework, the selector provides evi-
dence which is verified to be useful to the predic-
tor towards a particular decision. Importantly, the
final decision has been made on the full text, and
the selector is constrained to provide a highlight
that adheres to this exact decision. The selector
does not purport to provide a highlight which is
comprehensive of all evidence considered by the
predictor, but it provides a guarantee that the high-
lighted text is sufficient for this prediction.
It is trivial to see that the predict-select-verify
chain addresses all points of Section 4: Trojan
highlights and dominant selectors are impossi-
ble, as the selector is constrained to only provide
“retroactive” selections towards a specific priory-
decided prediction. In other words, the selector
has no power to influence the decision, since the
decision was already made without its interven-
tion. Loss of performance is impossible as the
predictor is not constrained to make predictions
on possibly insufficient subsets of the input (as it
would be under a summarizing selector).
9 Constructing a Predict-Select-Verify
Model with Contrastive Explanations
In order to design a model adhering to the afore-
mentioned constraints, we require solutions for the
predictor and for the selector.
Predictor. The predictor is constrained to be
able to accept both full-text inputs and highlighted
inputs. For this reason, we use masked language
modeling (MLM) models, such as BERT, (Devlin
et al., 2018) fine-tuned on the downstream task.
The MLM pre-training is performed by recover-
ing partially masked text, which conveniently suits
our needs. We additionally provide randomly-
highlighted inputs to the model during fine-tuning.
Selector. The selector is constrained to select
highlights for which the predictor made the same
decision as it did on the full text. However, there
are likely many possible choices that the selector
may make under this constraints, as there are many
possible highlights that all result in the same deci-
sion by the predictor. We wish for the selector
to select meaningful evidence to the predictor’s
Text and Highlight Label mp(h x) mp(hc  x)
Ohio Sues Best Buy, Alleging Used Sales (AP): AP - Ohio authorities sued Best Buy Co. Inc. on Thursday,
alleging the electronics retailer engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices.
Business Business Science/Tech
HK Disneyland Theme Park to Open in September: Hong Kong’s Disneyland theme park will open on Sept.
12, 2005 and become the driving force for growth in the city’s tourism industry, Hong Kong’s government and
Walt Disney Co.
Business Business World
Poor? Who’s poor? Poverty is down: The proportion of people living on less than $1 a day decreased from 40
to 21 percent of the global population between 1981 and 2001, says the World Bank’s latest annual report.
World World Business
Poor? Who’s poor? Poverty is down: The proportion of people living on less than $1 a day decreased from 40
to 21 percent of the global population between 1981 and 2001, says the World Bank’s latest annual report.
World World Business
Poor? Who’s poor? Poverty is down: The proportion of people living on less than $1 a day decreased from 40
to 21 percent of the global population between 1981 and 2001, says the World Bank’s latest annual report.
World World Business
Table 5: Examples of contrastive highlights (§ 9) of instances from the AG News corpus. The model used for mp
is fine-tuned bert-base-cased. Yellow highlight refers to h and yellow-and-red refers to hˆ.
decision. What is meaningful evidence? To an-
swer this question, we again refer to cognitive sci-
ence on necessary attributes of explanations that
are easy to comprehend by humans.
9.1 Fact and Foil
An especially relevant finding of social science lit-
erature is of contrastive explanations, following
the notion that the question “why P ?” is may be
followed by an addendum: “why P , rather than
Q?” (Hilton, 1988). We refer to P as the fact and
Q as the foil (Lipton, 1990). The concrete valua-
tion in the community is that in the vast majority of
cases, the cognitive burden of a “complete” expla-
nation, i.e. whereQ is ¬P , is too great, and thusQ
is selected as a subset of all possible foils (Hilton
and Slugoski, 1986; Hesslow, 1988), and often not
explicitly, but implicitly derived from context.
In classification tasks, the implication is that an
interpretation of a prediction of a specific class is
hard to understand, and should be contextualized
by the preference of the class over another—and
the selection of the foil (the non-predicted class)
is non-trivial, and a subject of ongoing discussion
even in human explanations literature.
Contrastive explanations have many implica-
tions for explanations in AI, and particularly for
highlights, as a vehicle for explanations that are
easy to understand. Although there is a mod-
est body of work on contrastive explanations
in machine learning (Dhurandhar et al., 2018;
Chakraborti et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020), to our
knowledge, there are none in NLP.
9.2 Contrastive Highlights
An explanation in a classification setting should
not only addresses the fact, but do so against a
foil—where the fact is the class predicted by the
model, and the foil is another class. Given two
classes c and cˆ,9 where mp(x) = c we are in-
terested in deriving a contrast highlight explana-
tion towards the question: “why did you choose c,
rather than cˆ?”.
We assume a scenario where, having observed
c, the user is aware of some highlight h which
should serve, they believe, as evidence for class
cˆ.10 In other words, we assume the user believes
a pipeline where mp(x) = cˆ and ms(x) = h is
reasonable.
If mp(h  x) 6= cˆ, then the user is made aware
that the predictor disagrees that h serves as evi-
dence for cˆ.
Otherwise, mp(h x) = cˆ. We define:
hc := argmin
h+hˆ
s. t. |hˆ|>0
∧mp((h+hˆ)x)=c
|h+ hˆ|.
hc is the minimal highlight containing h such
that mp(hc  x) = c. Intuitively, the claim by the
model is as such: “Because of hˆ, I consider hc as
evidence towards c despite h.”
We show examples of an implementation of this
process in Table 5 on examples from the AG News
dataset. For illustration purposes, we selected
incorrectly-classified examples, and selected the
foil to be the true label of the example. The high-
light for the foil was chosen by us.
9Selecting the foil, or selecting what to explain, is a dif-
ficult and interesting problem even in philosophical literature
(Hesslow, 1988; Mcgill and Klein, 1993; Chin-Parker and
Cantelon, 2017). In the classification setting, it is relatively
simple, as we may request the foil (class) from the user, or
provide separate contrastive explanations for each foil.
10In this work, we assume both cˆ and h are provided by
the user. Additional strategies are possible, such as deriving
candidates for h (heuristically or otherwise) given cˆ, and al-
lowing the user to choose and modify the h candidates.
We stress that while the examples presented in
these figures appear reasonable, the true goal of
this method is not to provide highlights that seem
justified, but to provide a framework which allows
models to be meaningfully incorporated in use-
cases of dispute, debug, and advice, with robust
and proven guarantees of behavior.
For example, in each of the example use-cases:
1. Dispute: The user intends on verifying
whether the model “correctly” considered a
specific portion of the input when making
the decision. I.e., the model made decision
cˆ, where the user believes decision c should
have been made, and is supported by evi-
dence h x. If mp(h x) 6= cˆ, it is possible
to dispute the claim that the model interpreted
h  x with “correct” evidence intent. Other-
wise the dispute claim cannot be made, as the
model provably considered h as evidence for
c, yet insufficiently so when combined with hˆ
as hc  x.
2. Debug: Assuming mp(x) is incorrect, the
user intends on performing error analysis by
observing which portion of the input is suf-
ficient to steer the predictor away from the
correct decision c. This is provided by hˆ.
3. Advice: When the user is unaware of the an-
swer, and is seeking perspective from a trust-
worthy model: then the user is given explicit
feedback on which part of the input the model
“believes” is sufficient to overturn the signal
in h towards c. Otherwise, if the model is not
considered trustworthy, the user may gain or
reduce trust by observing whether m(h  x)
and hˆ align with user priors.
10 Discussion
Causal attribution of heat-maps. Recent work
on the faithfulness of attention heat-maps (Baan
et al., 2019; Pruthi et al., 2019; Jain and Wallace,
2019; Serrano and Smith, 2019; Wiegreffe and
Pinter, 2019) or saliency distributions (Alvarez-
Melis and Jaakkola, 2018; Kindermans et al.,
2019) cast doubt on their faithfulness as indicators
to the significance of parts of the input (to a model
decision). We argue that is a natural conclusion
from the fact that as a community, we have not en-
visioned an appropriate causal chain that utilizes
heat-maps in the decision process, reinforcing the
claims in this work on the parallel between causal
attribution and faithfulness.
Inter-disciplinary research. Research on ex-
planations in artificial intelligence will benefit
from a deeper inter-disciplinary perspective on
two axes: (1) literature on causality and causal
attribution; and (2) literature on the social per-
ception and attribution of human-like behavior to
causal chains of decision or behavior.
10.1 Related Work
Relevant to the issue of how the explanation is
comprehended by people is simulatability (Kim
et al., 2017), or the degree to which humans can
simulate model decisions. Hase and Bansal (2020)
further refines simulatability evaluation by defin-
ing testing regimen where it can be properly as-
sessed without false signal. While quantifying
simulatability may be related to aligned faithful-
ness in some way, they are decidedly different,
since e.g., simulatabiliy will not necessarily de-
tect dominant selectors (Section 4), such as those
which reduce the input to a trivial instance of a
prior task prediction.
Predict-select-verify is reminiscent of iterative
erasure as described by (Feng et al., 2018). By
iteratively removing “significant” tokens in the
input, the authors discovered that a surprisingly
small portion of the input could be interpreted
as evidence for the model to make the predic-
tion, leading to conclusions on the pathological
nature of neural models and sensitivity to badly-
structured inputs. This experiment retroactively
serves as a successful use-case of examination and
debugging using our described formulation.
Kottur et al. (2017); Subramanian et al. (2020)
describe failure cases of Trojans where communi-
cating modules encode information unintuitively,
despite an interpretable interface between them.
Subramanian et al. (2020) additionally infer a par-
ticular social attribution on the causal chain of
their proposed model for tasks of compositional
reasoning with neural modular networks, with the
motivation of overcoming the Trojan issue, though
the work is not formalized as such.
The approach by Chang et al. (2019) for class-
wise highlights is reminiscent of contrastive high-
lights, but nevertheless distinct, since such high-
lights still explain a fact against all possible foils.
11 Conclusion
Highlights are a popular format for explanations
of decisions on textual inputs, relatively unique
in that there are models available today with the
ability to derive highlights faithfully. We analyze
highlights as a guiding use-case in the pursuit of
more rigorous formalization of what makes a qual-
ity explanation of an artificial intelligence model.
We redefine faithfulness as the degree to which
the interpretation of causal events accurately rep-
resents the causal chain of decision making to-
wards the decision. Next, we define aligned faith-
fulness as the degree to which the various deci-
sions in the causal chain are constrained by the
social attribution of behavior that humans expect
from the interpretation. The two steps of causal at-
tribution and social attribution together complete
the process of explaining the decision process of
the model to the human observer.
Using this formalization, we characterize var-
ious failures in faithful highlights that “seemed”
strange, but could not be properly described pre-
viously, noting they are not properly constrained
by their social attribution as summaries. We pro-
pose an alternative causal chain which can be con-
strained by the attribution of highlights as evi-
dence. Finally, we illustrate a possible implemen-
tation of this model with practical utility of dis-
puting, debugging or being advised by model de-
cisions, by formalizing contrastive explanations in
the highlight format.
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A Experimental Setup
A.1 Datasets
We elaborate on the experiments used to illustrate
the points raised in Section 4. For the most part,
these tasks are within precedence of relevant lit-
erature on highlights and rationales. The datasets
use prior train/validation/test set splits when avail-
able. When only train/test were available, 20% of
the train set was held out for validation. We elab-
orate below when no splits are available. Some of
these datasets were not used by us explicitly, but
we mention them here as we include performance
reports on them (provided in previous papers).
Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST-2/3/5)
(Socher et al., 2013) Sentences or snippets of
movie reviews with 2, 3 or 5-bucket polarity.
AG’s News Corpus (AG News) (Corso et al.,
2005) News articles categorized into four topics
of Science/Tech, Sports, Business, World.
Evidential Inference (Ev.Inf.) (Lehman et al.,
2019) Based on biomedical articles of controlled
trials, and a given intervention, the task is to infer
the outcome of the experiment as a result of the in-
tervention (among significantly increased, signifi-
cantly decreased, and no significant change), and
give supporting portions of the text towards this
conclusion. We use the article abstracts, and do
not evaluate the extracted supporting snippet.
Movies (Zaidan and Eisner, 2008) Movie re-
views labeled for binary polarity. Human-
annotated highlights were collected for this dataset
by DeYoung et al. (2019).
Multi RC (Khashabi et al., 2018) Binary clas-
sification of questions, answers and supporting
snippets, into true and false labels. The binary
setup was formulated by DeYoung et al. (2019).
LGD (Linzen et al., 2016) A collection of tem-
plate text sentences, each with two options for an
agreeing or disagreeing pair of words, for eval-
uation on the syntactic ability of models. We
converted this dataset into a binary classification
dataset by requiring prediction on whether a given
sentence contains a disagreement or whether all
words are in agreement. This dataset is unique in
that the choice of highlight is strict and punish-
ing if not “correct”, providing a strong challenge
to the selector in select-predict models. We have
employed a train/dev/test split of 50%/25%/25%
and enforced no overlap in sentences between the
splits.
20 Newsgroups (20 News) (Lang, 1995; Nigam
et al., 2000) A collection of newsgroup docu-
ments partitioned evenly across twenty categories.
Amazon Reviews (McAuley and Leskovec,
2013) and Elec (Johnson and Zhang, 2015)
Amazon product reviews with binary polarity
based on user star rating. Elec refers to electronic
products only.
Beer (McAuley et al., 2012) A collection of
BeerAdvocate reviews with polarity scores on four
aspects of appearance, smell, palate and taste.
